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What is the inﬂuence of syndicate organization on the duration of a loan
syndication process? We answer this question using the survival analysis
methodology on a sample of loans to borrowers from 59 countries. We ﬁnd
that syndicate size, concentration, experience, reputation, and national diver-
sity clearly matters for the duration of a syndication process and therefore for
borrower satisfaction regarding the speed of obtaining the necessary funding.
A syndicate organization adapted to speciﬁc agency problems of syndica-
tion, with numerous, reputable, and experienced arrangers retaining a larger
portion of the loan reduces the duration. The latter is also shorter when
more lenders come from the same country as the borrower. These eﬀects are
more pronounced when the borrower has a low reputation on the syndicated
lending market and when his opacity is stronger.
Keywords : Syndicated loan, syndication process, syndicate organiza-
tion, agency costs, experience, reputation, nationality, survival analysis.
JEL Classiﬁcation : F30, G15, G21, G32, C41.1 Introduction
This articles investigates the inﬂuence of the organizational characteristics
of a banks syndicate, such as size, concentration, and reputation, on the
duration of a loan syndication process, i.e. the time between the launching
of the syndication until the completion date, when the deal becomes active.
This duration is considered as the critical stage of the transaction cycle for
a syndicated loan (Rhodes, 2004). Therefore, it is an important criteria of
choice for the borrowers to apply for a syndicated loan 1, as the speed of
obtaining the necessary funding is considered to be a signiﬁcant advantage
of syndicated lending compared to bonds or a series of bilateral loans2.
However, syndicated lending has also its drawbacks because it implies
speciﬁc agency problems due to informational frictions between the mem-
bers of the syndicate. Following the theoretical work of Pichler and Wilhelm
(2001), recent empirical evidence shows that an adapted organizational struc-
ture of the syndicate is a crucial feature to mitigate syndication agency costs
(Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Suﬁ, 2007). Indeed, a small
and concentrated syndicate, with arrangers retaining a large portion of the
loan, allows for a better monitoring of an opaque borrower and can signal
its quality. Such organization mitigates also free-riding and hold-up within
the syndicate, while the presence of experienced and reputable arrangers en-
hances screening and monitoring of the borrower and acts as a certiﬁcation
device of his quality.
Therefore, syndicate organization has an important inﬂuence on the pric-
ing of syndicated loans (Harjoto et al., 2006; Ivashina, 2008; Focarelli et al.,
2008), borrower’s wealth (Preece and Mullineaux, 1996), and liquidity risk
management (Gatev and Strahan, 2008). Furthermore, the presence of estab-
lished and reputable lenders provides substantial advantages to the borrowers
1A syndicated loan is a loan deﬁned by a single agreement in which several banks
participate.
2Other advantages of syndicated lending for lenders and borrowers are portfolio and
sources of income diversiﬁcation and more competitive pricing and more ﬂexible funding
structure respectively. These beneﬁts can explain the the impressive development of the
syndicated lending, as the funds raised on this market represent more than one third of
the funds raised on the worldwide ﬁnancial markets (Altunbas et al., 2005).
1(Gopalan et al., 2007; Ross, 2007; Panyagometh and Roberts, 2008). Overall,
the organization of a syndicate matters for the borrower, as it inﬂuences loan
terms and wealth.
However, the inﬂuence of syndicate organization on the duration of the
syndication process seems neglected in existing academic literature3. This
is surprising for two reasons. First, informational problems that raise syn-
dication speciﬁc agency problems can interfere with eﬃcient and fast deci-
sion making (Kocher and Sutter, 2006; Schulte and Gruner, 2007). Second,
empirical evidence shows that the organizational structure of teams have a
signiﬁcant impact on the speed of decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ta-
laulicar et al., 2005). Hence, a syndicate organization which is supposed to
be adapted to syndicate speciﬁc agency problems should also play an impor-
tant role in the syndication process duration.
This duration is of particular interest for the borrower for evident reasons
related to the speed of obtaining the funds. For that reason, one of the main
arguments driving the choice of a bank that will arrange the syndication is
his speed of action. The arranger is the key ﬁgure of a syndication because
he is the privileged agent in the relationship between the borrower and the
syndicate. Thus, he is responsible for a crucial feature of an eﬃcient and
successful loan syndication: the syndicate organization.
The aim of this article is to investigate the inﬂuence of syndicate orga-
nization on the duration of a syndication process. Indeed, it is particularly
relevant to empirically document if syndicate organization inﬂuences this
duration, and which characteristics are the most important to guarantee the
shortest syndication process. Such evidence is valuable for borrowers, be-
cause their satisfaction is increasing with fast and eﬃcient syndication, as
well as lenders, because their reputation is contingent on the duration of
the syndication process. Finally, empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween syndicate organization and duration of syndication process adds to the
growing literature on syndicated lending.
To test the inﬂuence of syndicate organization on the duration of the
3Godlewski (2008) provides a broad empirical investigation of factors driving the du-
ration of a syndication process.
2syndication process, we employ accelerated failure time models on a sample
of more than 4,800 syndicated loans for borrowers from 59 countries during
the 1992 − 2006 period. We use various measures of syndicate organization,
such as size, concentration, experience and reputation, and composition.
We ﬁnd that syndicate organization clearly matters for syndication pro-
cess duration. The latter can be signiﬁcantly reduced provided a larger num-
ber of arrangers, who retain larger shares of the loan, and are more reputable
and experienced players on the syndicated lending market. These character-
istics become even more critical when the borrower has a low reputation on
the syndicated lending market or when he is more opaque. Furthermore, the
duration is shorter when an important share of lenders in the syndicate are
from the same country as the borrower, as well as when a large percentage
of lenders within the syndicate are themselves from the same country. How-
ever, when the loan is syndicated to a borrower from an emerging market,
the presence of reputable international arrangers matters more for a quick
syndication process.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the loan
syndication process and discusses the arguments linking syndication speciﬁc
agency problems and syndicate organization to the syndication process dura-
tion. Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of various measures of syndicate
organization. Section 4 presents the data and the accelerated failure time
model methodology. Results are displayed and discussed in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 provides our conclusions.
2 Loan syndication process and syndicate or-
ganization
This section is devoted to the description of a typical loan syndication process
which duration is the central issue of this article. We also discuss arguments
linking agency problems and syndicate organization to the syndication pro-
cess duration.
32.1 Loan syndication process
Bank loan syndication can be considered as a sequential process, which can
be separated into three main stages4: the pre-mandated stage during which
the details of the proposed transaction are discussed and ﬁnalized, the post-
mandated stage during which the syndication itself takes place and facility
agreements are negotiated, and the operational post-signing stage.
More precisely, during the pre-mandated stage, after soliciting competi-
tive oﬀers to arrange and manage the syndication with one or more banks
(usually its main banks)5, the borrower chooses one or more arrangers that
are mandated to form a syndicate and negotiates a preliminary loan agree-
ment. The syndication can be sole or joint mandated, the latter involving
the participation of more than one lead bank6. The arranger is responsible
for the negotiation of key loan terms with the borrower, the appointment
of participants7 and the structuring of the syndicate. His compensation is
mainly composed of various fees (agency, arrangement, commitment, ...).
The post-mandated stage involves the placement of the loan. This stage
is considered as crucial for the transaction cycle of a syndication. Indeed,
both the borrower and the arrangers have committed themselves to raise
funds and are therefore at risk. During this stage, the arranger prepares a
documentation package for the potential syndicate members, called an in-
formation memorandum. It usually contains information about borrower
creditworthiness and loan terms. The initial set of targeted participants is
strongly determined by the arranger. Their previous experience with the bor-
rower, the industry sector or the geographic area are strong drivers for being
4See Esty (2001); Rhodes (2004); Taylor and Sansone (2007) for a detailed presentation
of the syndicated lending process.
5Principal milestones before the submission of a bid by banks are the identiﬁcation and
articulation of the borrower’s need from the syndicated credit market, the decision on a
bidding conﬁguration and strategy by the banks, and the internal approval of the credit
by the potential arrangers.
6Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order to maximize the likeli-
hood of a successful syndication, in terms of loan characteristics, subscription and duration
of the syndication process.
7Participants lend a portion of the loan and receive a compensation essentially com-
posed of a spread.
4chosen by the arranger to join the syndicate. A roadshow is then organized
to present and discuss the content of the information memorandum, as well
as to announce closing fees and establish a timetable for commitments and
closing. The participants can make comments and suggestions in order to
inﬂuence the structure and the pricing of the loan. After the roadshow, the
arranger makes formal invitations to potential participants and determines
the allocation given to each participant.
The post-signing stage takes place after the completion date when the
deal becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and
the syndicate members by the debt contract8.
2.2 Agency problems, syndicate organization, and syn-
dication process duration
Loan syndication involves several actors - the arrangers, the participants
and the borrower - and is a complex process involving speciﬁc agency costs.
The latter are the consequence of informational frictions within the syndi-
cate which can harm eﬃcient and fast decision making (Kocher and Sutter,
2006; Schulte and Gruner, 2007), and thus can interfere with the beneﬁts
of syndicated loan, both for the borrower and the lenders, mitigating the
intrinsic advantages of this source of funds for ﬁrms. However, these costs
can be reduced through an adapted organization of the syndicate, which
can ultimately inﬂuence the duration of the syndication process. Indeed, as
shown by Eisenhardt (1989); Talaulicar et al. (2005), team organization has
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the speed of decision making.
Syndication-speciﬁc agency problems are of two types. First, the arranger
possesses more information about the borrower either because of the private
information collected through a previous lending relationship or through due
diligence. This private information creates an adverse selection problem as
the arranger may be inclined to syndicate loans to bad borrowers. Second,
8The contract sets out the terms and conditions of the loan: the amount, the purpose,
the period, the rate of interest plus any fees, the periodicity and the design of repayments
and the presence of any security.
5the participant banks may delegate some monitoring tasks to the arranger.
This may result in a moral hazard problem as the eﬀorts of the lead bank are
unobservable for participant banks. These agency problems can be mitigated
by an adequate organization of the syndicate.
Indeed, the presence of numerous arrangers can reduce adverse selection
problems related to private information (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones
et al., 2005; Suﬁ, 2007). It is likely that some of the arrangers will act as spe-
cialized agents during the syndication, thus resulting in a better handling of
the process, with increased cost eﬃciency and reduced informational asym-
metry (Fran¸ cois and Missionier-Piera, 2007). Greater concentration of the
portions of the loan retained by the arrangers is more suited to cope with
free-riding and moral hazard problems, as well as with hold-up problems in
case of borrower’s distress and subsequent reorganization and renegotiation
(Esty and Megginson, 2003). Furthermore, arrangers’ retained share of the
loan provides a signal of their commitment to eﬃciently monitor the borrower
and can also be considered as a device to align lenders’ incentives within the
syndicate and to signal borrower’s quality (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Suﬁ,
2007). As syndicates with numerous arrangers retaining signiﬁcant portions
of the loan mitigate agency costs of syndication, we expect such syndicate
structures to have a negative inﬂuence on the syndication process duration.
As the arrangers are responsible for due diligence, allocation of the loan to
other syndicate members, and ex post monitoring, banks in the syndicate will
often rely on the leaders reputation in making lending decisions (Ross, 2007).
Therefore, reputation is an important aspect for syndicated lending (Gopalan
et al., 2007). Indeed, reputable and experienced leaders can enhance mon-
itoring and ability to attract participants, signal borrower and deal qual-
ity, and reduce agency costs (Ross, 2007; Gatti et al., 2008; Panyagometh
and Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, certiﬁcation by experienced, reputable,
and prestigious arrangers creates economic value by reducing overall costs
of syndicated loans. Hence, we expect that the presence of experienced and
reputable arrangers in the syndicate should reduce the syndication process
duration.
Finally, recent evidence by Carey et al. (1998) and Hao (2004) shows
6that lenders identity matters for bank lending. Furthermore, Tykvova and
Schertler (2008) show that physical distance between borrowers and lenders
inﬂuences information-related transaction costs, which are important drivers
of successful syndication. Moreover, previous experience in the geographic
area is an important driver for choosing syndicate members by the arranger,
in order to mitigate informational frictions regarding the borrower as well as
between the lenders of the syndicate (Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007;
Suﬁ, 2007). Therefore, we expect the syndicate composition in terms of
lenders’ nationality to have an impact on the duration of the syndication
process. However, the sign of this eﬀect remains a matter of empirical tests.
A syndicate with more lenders from the same country as the borrower should
enhance better knowledge of the latter thus reducing informational frictions
within the syndicate and the duration of the syndication process. Better
trust and understanding can also be achieved when more lenders within the
syndicate are from the same country, but such a syndication composition can
also generate collusion risk, exacerbate agency costs, and thus increase the
syndication process duration.
To summarize, as syndicate organization can be considered as a response
to speciﬁc agency problems of loan syndication, it should also inﬂuence the
duration of the syndication process which is sensitive to agency costs.
3 Empirical design
In this section we describe the syndicate organization variables and their
expected inﬂuence on the syndication process duration. We also present loan
and country control variables used in the regressions. Table 1 provides the
deﬁnitions of all variables used in this article.
3.1 Syndicate organization variables
The key ﬁgures of a syndicate are the number of arrangers and the concen-
tration of the shares of the loan retained by the arrangers. The concentration
is measured by the normalized Herﬁndhal-Hirschman Index of the shares of
7the loan retained by the arrangers (Concentration of arrangers)9. The size
of the syndicate corresponds to the number of arrangers in the syndicate
(Number of arrangers). We expect both of these measures to have a nega-
tive inﬂuence on the syndication process duration. A larger syndicate“core”
with greater retained portions of the loan implies better handling of agency
problems related to monitoring of the borrower as several delegated monitors
are present. Furthermore, greater concentration can signal a borrower with
better quality.
We also consider experience and reputation measures in the syndicate,
which bring a certiﬁcation device regarding the quality of the borrower and
of the loan. Top 10 arrangers (presence) and Top 10 arrangers (market) are
variables based on the percentage of the arrangers in the syndicate who are
in the top 10-th percentile distribution of the most frequent arrangers and
of the arrangers having the greatest market shares of the syndicated lending
market respectively10. League table arrangers is based on the percentage of
the arrangers in the syndicate who are listed on the Loan Pricing Corpora-
tion (Reuters) Global League Table11. The distinction between presence and
market share provides a more detailed insight into the importance of being
on the market versus having greater shares of the market (the “dominant
bank eﬀect”, Ross, 2007). Experience, skills and reputation can be acquired
through more intense participation in deals but also through less participa-
tion but greater stakes of syndicated loans. Being listed on a League Table
is a strong signal of arranger’s quality and market reputation. For all these
reasons, we expect a negative impact of these measures on the syndication
process duration.
9An alternative variable is the share of the loan retained by the arranger (or the mean
share if there are several arrangers) but we experience convergence problems when estimat-
ing the model with this alternative variable. Nevertheless, the latter is strongly correlated
with the Concentration of arrangers variable in our sample.
10Details regarding the computation of these measures can be found in table 1. The
median value of arrangers participation in loan syndications equals 4, while the top 10-th
percentile equals 55. The median value of arrangers market share in the syndicated lending
market equals 0.00016, while the top 10-th percentile equals 0.00107. There are 78 top 10
arrangers who are the most present and 61 top 10 arrangers who have the greatest market
share.
11The list of arrangers from the Global League Table is provided in table 1.
8We also use several measures of the composition of the syndicate with a
particular focus on the nationality of the lenders. We compute the percentage
of lenders in the syndicate that are from the same country as the borrower,
diﬀerentiating lenders regarding their titles (and thus their ranks), and clas-
sifying them into three categories12: top (i.e. leaders of the syndicate), mid
(i.e. managers of the syndicate), and low (i.e. participants of the syndicate)
lenders. We also measure the percentage of lenders classiﬁed as low and top,
as well as low and mid, who are from the same country. Here, we focus on
the titles of the lenders and we consider them as signals of their importance
in the hierarchy of the syndicate13.
This leads to four additional variables labeled Same country top lenders,
Same country mid lenders, Same country mid-low lenders, and Same country
top-low lenders14. The sign and magnitude of these measures are relatively
unclear. On the one hand, greater percentage of lenders from the same
country as the borrower, whatever their position in the syndicate hierarchy,
should reduce the duration. Indeed, information sharing can be more eﬃcient
if the lenders come from the same country. This helps to overcome important
informational frictions within the syndicate, regarding both the members and
the borrower. Furthermore, comparative advantages in terms of ﬁnancing and
information sharing are expected to grow with such syndicate composition,
i.e. where lenders are from the same country.
On the other hand, a greater proximity between top lenders and the bor-
rower may exacerbate adverse selection problems, if the informational gain of
the top lenders is not shared with other lenders. It is plausible that a greater
percentage of top and low lenders from the same country might exacerbate
potential informational problems from the“syndicate managers”perspective
and thus increase agency costs of syndication, and in consequence slow down
the duration of the syndication process. It might also exacerbate potential
12Classiﬁcation of lenders is described in table 1.
13The aggregation of the titles into three categories is based on Rhodes (2004) and
Taylor and Sansone (2007).
14We do not use other measures such as the percentage of low lenders in the syndicate
who are from the same country as the borrower because such percentage is usually very
close to 100 percent. For the same reasons, we do not use the percentage of low and mid
lenders who are from the same country within the syndicate.
9collusive behavior of these type of lenders and enhance the expropriation risk
of other lenders. In case of borrower’s distress, such composition can leave
the other lenders with unsatisfactory solutions. Hence, we can observe a
positive inﬂuence of these variables on the syndication process duration.
3.2 Loan and country control variables
Following Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Esty and Megginson (2003); Lee
and Mullineaux (2004); Suﬁ (2007); Godlewski and Weill (2008), we take
main loan characteristics such as the logarithm of loan size (Loan size),
lenders’ compensation (Spread and Fee), loan maturity (Maturity), pres-
ence of a guarantor (Guarantors), covenants (Covenants), and debt seniority
(Senior debt) into account. To control for the impact of publicly available
information, we include a dummy variable S&P Rating equal to one if a Stan-
dard and Poor’s senior debt rating is available. We also control for the type
and purpose of the loan, benchmark rate, facility issue year, geographical
area, and industry. In order to take legal risk into account, we include the
protection of creditor rights (Creditor Rights) and law enforcement (Rule of
Law) indexes provided by Djankov et al. (2007) and LaPorta et al. (1998).
4 Data and methodology
We ﬁrst present the sample and descriptive statistics. Then, the econometric
methodology employed to investigate the determinants of the syndication
process duration is exposed.
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Information on the duration of syndication process, syndicate organization,
and loan characteristics come from the Dealscan database, provided by the
Loan Pricing Corporation (Reuters). Data concerning country characteristics
come from LaPorta et al. (1998), and Djankov et al. (2007).
The sample size is determined by information availability on the endoge-
nous and exogenous variables used in the regressions. The endogenous vari-
10able is the syndication process duration, measured in days since the launching
date until the completion date, when the deal becomes active. We use only
completed syndicated loans and eliminate the outliers for the endogenous
variable : deals with duration greater than the 99-percentile, equal to 243
days (above 8 months). Therefore, we obtain a sample of 4,807 syndicated
loans from 59 countries for the period between 1992 and 2006.
Descriptive statistics can be found in table 1, while the distribution of the
number of loans, and lenders-tranches and mean syndication process duration
by country are displayed in table 2.
We observe that the mean of a syndication process duration equals 55.14
days (almost 8 weeks) with a standard deviation of 37.02 days. We also re-
mark that emerging market borrowers have the largest durations, sometimes
above 100 days in the Czech Republic, Oman and Venezuela. Borrowers from
these countries represent a signiﬁcant part of our sample, while banks from
Western Europe and North America represent a majority of the lenders. On
these markets, the presence of experienced arrangers is the most important,
as Top 10 arrangers (presence) and Top 10 arrangers (market) equal to 70%
and 7% respectively. The maximum average for league table arrangers can
also be found in North America (26%). On the contrary, the average values
of these syndicate organization measures are the lowest in emerging markets,
for instance less than 50% and 1% respectively for Top 10 arrangers (pres-
ence) and Top 10 arrangers (market) in Eastern Europe. The minimum
average for League table arrangers is for Latin America (12%). A similar
frontier between industrialized and emerging markets exist for the measures
of syndicate composition in terms of lenders’ nationality. For instance, the
average value of Same country top lenders equals 30% in Western Europe
and 22% in Latin America.
4.2 Econometric speciﬁcation
Since the dependent variable is the duration of a syndication process, the
appropriate methodology is survival analysis which is used to analyze data
in which the time until the event is of interest, called an event time.
11Survival data are generally described and modeled in terms of two related
functions15, namely the survival and hazard functions respectively. Let T
represent the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of a certain
random event. Here T is the syndication process duration and S(t) the
survival probability that the syndication process lasts from the time origin
(launching date) to a future time t, and is deﬁned as
S(t) = Prob(T ≥ t) = 1 − F(t), (1)
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution function for T.
The hazard is usually denoted by h(t) (also called instantaneous event
rate) and is the rate of transition of the syndicated process duration to com-
pletion, given it has not been completed before. The hazard function is
deﬁned formally by
h(t) = lim∆t→0






where f(t) is the probability density function of T evaluated at t. Since
δS(t)





the negative of the slope of the log of the survival function.
When estimating hazard functions, we need to assume a hazard func-
tion speciﬁcation. The latter can use parametric survival models known as
accelerated failure time (AFT) models16. An AFT model speciﬁes that the
predictors act multiplicatively on the event time or additively on the log
of event time. The eﬀect of a predictor is to alter the rate at which the
syndication process proceeds along time axis.
15See Kiefer (1988) and Harrell (2001) for a detailed description of survival analysis.
16Another possibility is to use the proportional hazards (PH) model, where h(t) =
h0(t)exp(X′β), given the predictors X and the baseline hazard rate h0(t). The latter
can be left unspeciﬁed and estimated using the Cox’s semiparametric partial likelihood
(Cox, 1972, 1975) or take a speciﬁc parametric form such as Weibull or exponential dis-
tributions. Within this approach, the hazards are supposed to be proportional over time.
This assumption is strongly rejected in our case.
12In this framework, the logarithm of the survival time log(t) is expressed
as a linear function of the covariates X :
log(t) = α + X
′β + ǫ, (4)
where α is the intercept and ǫ is the error term with density f(t). The
distributional form of the error term determines the regression model17. The
hazard function in an AFT model takes the form
h(t) = h0 exp(α + X
′β)(exp(α + X
′β)t), (5)
where h0 is the baseline hazard rate. The hazard function is estimated
using maximum likelihood methods.
5 Results and discussion
In this section, we present and discuss the estimations results and provide
some robustness checks. First, we provide estimate results for speciﬁcations
with syndicate size, concentration, experience, and reputation measures only.
Second, we discuss the results obtained with syndicate composition measures
only. Third, we provide results including both type of measures in the regres-
sions. Fourth, we discuss results regarding the eﬀect of borrower reputation
and opacity on the relationship between syndication organization and syndi-
cation process duration. Fifth, we focus on emerging markets borrower eﬀects
on the syndicate organization and syndication process duration. Finally, we
present several robustness checks.
17With normal, logistic, extreme-value and three-parameter gamma density functions,
we obtain respectively log-normal, log-logistic, Weibull and generalized gamma regressions.
135.1 Inﬂuence of syndicate size, concentration, experi-
ence, and reputation on syndication process dura-
tion
As the proportional hazard assumption is strongly rejected by Schoenﬂed
residuals tests, we estimate an AFT model assuming a generalized gamma
distribution, as the latter provides the lowest log likelihood, as well as Akaike
and Schwarz information criterions. Results are displayed in table 3.
First of all, most of the variables of interest exhibit statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, suggesting that syndicate organization has an economic impact
on syndication process duration.
As expected, a greater number of arrangers and their concentration sig-
niﬁcantly reduces the syndication process duration. We remark that the co-
eﬃcient for Concentration of arrangers is much greater than for Number of
arrangers, suggesting that the former organizational characteristic of a syn-
dicate matters more for quicker syndication process. A greater percentage of
experienced and reputable arrangers also signiﬁcantly reduces the syndica-
tion process. Greater percentage of experienced arrangers having important
market shares matters more for quick syndication process as the coeﬃcient for
Top 10 arrangers (market) is the greatest among the measures of experience
and reputation.
What seems to really matter for a quick and thus eﬃcient loan syndi-
cation process is the presence of experienced arrangers on the syndicated
lending market and the concentration of arrangers rather than the presence
of frequent or reputable players on the syndicated lending market. Indeed,
arrangers retaining signiﬁcant shares of the loan or having acquired signiﬁ-
cant experience through the arrangement of large syndicated deals provides
an important signal regarding the quality of the borrower and of the deal, as
well as of the arranger, and thus allows to provide funds more quickly.
145.2 Inﬂuence of syndicate composition on syndication
process duration
We now turn to the discussion of the results obtained with syndicate com-
position measures only, displayed in table 4. Most of the variables exhibit
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, suggesting that syndicate composition has
an economic impact on loan syndication process duration18.
The arguments on potential collusion problems seem to be validated as
Same country top lenders exhibit positive coeﬃcients, while Same country
mid lenders has a negative inﬂuence on the duration. Within syndicate
composition also has a signiﬁcant impact on duration, as Same country mid-
low lenders bears a negative coeﬃcient sign.
As top lenders are usually borrower relationship banks or established
institutions on the syndicated lending market, they usually have access to
privileged information, that might be used against other members of the
syndicate. This can exacerbate agency costs and thus make the syndica-
tion process last longer. This adverse eﬀect of Same country top lenders is
somehow mitigated when taking Same country mid lenders into account, but
still remains. A greater percentage of syndicate “managers” from the same
country reduces the duration as the coeﬃcient exhibit a signiﬁcantly negative
sign. Finally, a greater percentage of close mid and low lenders in terms of na-
tionality signiﬁcantly reduces the duration due to better information sharing
between “managers” and participants. The greatest coeﬃcient and thus the
most important economic eﬀect is for the Same country top lenders variable,
although it makes the duration of the syndication process last longer.
5.3 Inﬂuence of syndicate size, experience, reputation,
and composition on syndication process duration
Now we include all types of syndicate organization measures in the regressions
to get a deeper insight into the main syndicate design features that drives
18Due to the correlation structure, Same country mid-low lenders and Same country
top-low lenders cannot be included in the same regression.
15the syndication process duration. Results are displayed in table 519.
Results remain robust, as all coeﬃcients for the syndicate organization
variables remain signiﬁcant and with the same signs as in tables 3 and 4.
Syndicate size, experience, and reputation are always signiﬁcantly negative
with similar magnitude of coeﬃcients, while syndicate composition variables
exhibit same coeﬃcients as in table 4, but their values are aﬀected. This
is particularly the case in the regression with Number of arrangers, where
the coeﬃcients of Same country top lenders and Same country mid lenders
gain between 0.07 and 0.09, while Same country mid-low lenders and Same
country top-low lenders gain more than 0.20. This suggests that syndicate
composition eﬀect on syndication process duration is reinforced when tak-
ing syndicate size into account. Indeed, syndicate composition should play a
greater role when the syndicate size is larger. This eﬀect is far less pronounced
when looking at the coeﬃcients for Top 10 arrangers and syndication com-
position. In that case, the latter have even lower magnitude when compared
to those in table 4.
Overall, conclusions drawn from the results obtained in tables 3 and 4
remain. Syndicate organization matters for syndication process duration,
which can be signiﬁcantly reduced provided arrangers retaining larger shares
of the loan, and having more experience on the syndicated lending market.
Furthermore, a greater geographic closeness in terms of nationality between
the“managers”of the syndicate and the borrower is also beneﬁcial for quick
syndication process. This is also achieved when“managers”and participants
come from the same country.
5.4 Borrower reputation and opacity eﬀects
We investigate more deeply the eﬀect of borrower reputation and opacity
on the relationship between syndication process duration and syndicate or-
ganization. Indeed, previous results, i.e. the importance of concentration,
19We do not display results with the Concentration of arrangers variable because of
convergence problems when estimating the model with this variable and syndicate com-
position measures. Although not displayed due to lack of space, coeﬃcients for loan and
country control variables remain overall unchanged compared to results in tables 3 and 4.
16experience and geographical closeness of the members of the syndicate, should
be even more pronounced if the borrower has acquired less reputation on the
syndicated loan market or when he is more opaque. Indeed, lending to such
borrowers is more exposed to informational problems and to agency problems
within the syndicate.
Borrower reputation is computed using the number of diﬀerent arrangers
that have arranged a deal for a particular borrower in our sample. Indeed,
a borrower who has been funded with syndicated loans arranged by various
arrangers acquires valuable reputation on the syndicated lending market,
as more arrangers have a better knowledge regarding his business and risk
proﬁle, as well as his ﬁnancing needs. More precisely, for each borrower we
compute the number of interactions (or links) that he had with a diﬀerent
arranger for a deal in the sample 20. Then, we use the median of that measure,
equal to 8, to classify the borrowers as having low reputation if their number
of interactions is lower than 8. We consider as opaque a borrower who is not
listed on a stock exchange. Public ﬁrms are usually considered as being more
transparent compared to private ones.
Results are displayed in tables 6 and 721 for the borrower reputation and
opacity inﬂuences respectively. When comparing to our base results in tables
3 and 4, we remark several important modiﬁcations of the coeﬃcients. The
most striking ones concern the increase of the coeﬃcient for Concentration
of arrangers in table 6, which gains 0.13, and the lack of signiﬁcance for Top
10 arrangers (market). Apparently, lack of borrower reputation reinforces
the role of arrangers retained shares concentration which serves as a signal
of eﬃcient screening and monitoring of the borrower as well as his quality.
Arrangers experience plays no signiﬁcant role in that case. Regarding the
syndicate composition measures, we also observe signiﬁcant changes. First,
the presence of“managers”geographically close to the borrower vanishes away
20The mean of the number of interactions (or links) equals 11.08 with a standard de-
viation of 12.69. This means that an average borrower had 11 interactions with diﬀerent
arrangers in the sample.
21We experienced convergence problems for the regressions with Number of arrangers
and Concentration of arrangers and we cannot provide estimation results for these two
speciﬁcations for opaque borrowers.
17the eﬀect of Same country top lenders, while potential collusive eﬀects are
now present on the top-low lenders level, as the latter coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
and positive.
In table 7, the eﬀect of arrangers experience is strongly reinforced as
the coeﬃcient of Top 10 arrangers (market) gains 0.38 compared to table 3
and appears as being crucial for opaque borrowers getting syndicated loans
quickly. Thus, borrower opacity seems to have a diﬀerent eﬀect compared to
his reputation. Furthermore, the collusive eﬀect of top lenders being from
the same country as the borrower is stronger, as the coeﬃcients gain between
0.08 and 0.10. It seems that borrower opacity leaves more room for potential
collusive behavior within the syndicate.
Overall, borrower characteristics such as reputation and opacity matters
for syndication process duration, as syndicate organization features such as
arrangers retained shares concentration or experience become much more
critical when the borrower has a low reputation or is more opaque.
5.5 Emerging markets borrower eﬀect
As a signiﬁcant part of the loans in our sample are provided to borrowers
from emerging markets, we investigate if this feature has an impact on our re-
sults. Indeed, as shown by Nini (2004), the presence of a domestic participant
in a syndicated loan to borrowers in developing economies has a signiﬁcant
and negative impact on the cost of funds, because the presence of a local
lender from these markets, considered as more opaque than industrialized
economies, reduces informational problems within the syndicate. However,
domestic lenders usually lack of necessary competence, expertise, know-how,
knowledge, experience and reputation regarding syndicated lending (Tykvova
and Schertler, 2008). This might explain the presence of several arrangers,
with domestic ones reducing informational and relational problems, and the
international ones bringing their experience and reputation. Thus, it is pos-
sible that syndicates lending to emerging markets borrowers have speciﬁc
features adapted to such problems and might inﬂuence diﬀerently the syndi-
cation process duration.
18In our sample, the average number of arrangers is greater for deals ar-
ranged for emerging markets borrowers (7.8) as compared to non emerging
markets deals (4.67). Furthermore, the average percentage of top lenders
from the same country as the borrower is lower for emerging market borrow-
ers than for industrialized ones (21.08% versus 37.05%)22. These signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent syndicate structures translate in a diﬀerence of 8 days only regarding
the average syndication process duration for emerging versus industrialized
market borrowers23.
When regressing the syndication process duration on the presence of
league table arrangers and of same country top lenders for a sub-sample
of deals syndicated for emerging market borrowers, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for the latter variable, while the former is signiﬁcant and nega-
tive. League table arrangers coeﬃcient gains 0.18 in that case as compared
to the coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (1.5a) in table 5. Hence, even if the syn-
dicates lending to borrowers from emerging markets are diﬀerent in terms
of organization, we do not ﬁnd any empirical evidence on the added value
of local lenders presence regarding informational problems with respect to
the syndication process duration. What matters for quick syndication pro-
cess duration is the presence of reputable international arrangers with the
necessary expertise and knowledge in arranging the deals.
5.6 Robustness checks
We have performed several robustness checks regarding the use of alternative
variables, bounding the endogenous variable, and applying other estimation
methods and procedures.
When performing the regressions on a reduced sample with elimination
of syndication process durations over 100 and 200 days respectively does not
alter the results. Coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant with the same signs, although
their magnitude is reduced. Using more restrictive deﬁnitions to compute the
22We also observe a similar diﬀerence regarding league table arrangers (17.65% in emerg-
ing markets vs 23.94% in industrialized markets).
23The average durations for emerging and non emerging market borrowers equal 50.73
and 42.21 days respectively.
19Top arrangers measures as well as Same country top lenders gives very similar
results24. Furthermore, when considering the frequency of the borrower’s
presence on the syndicate lending market as an alternative measure of his
reputation 25 gives virtually similar results, although the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients are reduced.
For all the estimations obtained with a gamma model, the magnitude and
the signiﬁcance of the covariates are similar to those obtained with Weibull,
log-logistic and log-normal models. We have also followed a two-step proce-
dure in order to address the potential endogeneity issue between the duration
and the syndicate organization26. In the ﬁrst step, using OLS we regress the
various syndicate organization measures on the loan characteristics already
used in the estimations. In the second step, using an AFT model with gamma
distribution we regress the syndication process duration on the ﬁtted syndi-
cate organization measures from step one. Results from step two are similar
to those already obtained regarding the coeﬃcients signiﬁcance and sign.
Overall, results regarding the inﬂuence of syndicate organization on syn-
dication process duration hold after surviving several robustness checks.
6 Conclusion
Informational problems that raise syndication speciﬁc agency problems can
interfere with eﬃcient and fast decision making (Kocher and Sutter, 2006;
Schulte and Gruner, 2007). Following Pichler and Wilhelm (2001), empirical
evidence supports the argument that an adapted organizational structure of
the syndicate is a crucial feature to mitigate these agency problems (Lee
and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Suﬁ, 2007). This organizational
structure of the banking team may have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed
24Alternative deﬁnitions implied considering agent, arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger,
lead bank, mandated arranger, and senior arranger titles only, or agent, arranger, bookrun-
ner, mandated arranger titles only.
25In that case, we simply count the number of times a particular borrower is funded by
a syndicated loan in the sample to compute his frequency of presence on the market.
26In order to not overload the paper we do not provide these results but they are available
upon request.
20of decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989; Talaulicar et al., 2005). Therefore, a
syndicate organization which is supposed to be adapted to syndicate speciﬁc
agency problems, should also have an important inﬂuence on the syndication
process duration.
Using a sample of more than 4,800 syndicated loans to borrowers from
59 countries for the 1992−2006 period, we have employed accelerated failure
time models to test the inﬂuence of the syndicate organization on the loan
syndication process duration, measured in days since the syndication launch-
ing date until the completion date when the loan contract is signed. This
stage of a transaction cycle for a syndicated loan is considered as the most
critical because both the borrower and the arrangers are at risk (Rhodes,
2004). We measure syndicate organization with various characteristics re-
lated to syndicate size, concentration, experience, reputation and composi-
tion.
Empirical results show that syndicate organization clearly matters for
syndication process duration. In particular, arrangers’ retained loan shares
concentration and experience are crucial inputs allowing to signiﬁcantly speed
up the syndication process and thus providing the borrower with necessary
funds in a shorter amount of time. Indeed, these two main features provide
an eﬃcient signal regarding the handling of the syndication process, of the
agency problems, and of the borrower quality. They become even more criti-
cal when the borrower has a low reputation on the syndicated lending market
or when he is more opaque.
Furthermore, the duration is shorter when an important share of “man-
agers” in the syndicate are from the same country as the borrower, as well
as when a large percentage of participants and “managers” come from the
same country. This result receives an interpretation related to the reduction
of informational frictions within the syndicate when such composition is at
work. However, the presence of local arrangers has no signiﬁcant impact on
the duration when the loan is syndicated to a borrower from an emerging
market. In that case, what really matters for quick syndication process is
the presence of reputable international arrangers.
Overall, the syndication process duration can be signiﬁcantly reduced
21provided a larger number of arrangers, who retain larger shares of the loan,
and are more reputable and experienced players on the syndicated lending
market. These are the most important features to be taken into account by
the borrower if his main interest is for short syndication process duration in
order to access the necessary funds quickly. Thus, the syndicate organization
is an important input for corporate ﬁnance decisions and should be carefully
analyzed by the borrower but also by the lenders. Finally, these results con-
tribute to the existing literature on the importance of syndicate organization
for successful and value enhancing loan syndication.
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25Table 1: Variables deﬁnition and descriptive statistics
The table provides a brief description and descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions, with a distinction of
loan, syndicate organization, and country characteristics, as well as control variables. Loan, syndicate organization and
control variables come from Dealscan (LPC, Reuters). Country characteristics come from LaPorta et al. (1998); Djankov
et al. (2007).





Duration of the loan syndication process since
the launching date until the completion date,
measured in days.
4807 55.1367 37.0186
Loan size Logarithm of the size of the loan (in million
USD).
4807 18.5816 1.3801
Spread Spread over the benchmark rate (in bps). 4807 110.6984 79.8330
Fee Up front fee (in bps). 4807 52.6986 43.6978
Maturity Maturity of the loan (in months). 4807 53.8417 36.0990
Guarantors = 1 if there is at least one guarantor. 4807 0.0957 0.2942
Covenants = 1 if the loan agreement includes ﬁnancial
covenants.
4807 0.1157 0.3199
Senior debt = 1 if the debt is senior. 4807 0.2528 0.4346
S&P rating = 1 if the borrower has a senior debt rating
by Standard & Poor’s.
4807 0.0616 0.2404
Term loan = 1 if the loan is a term loan. 4807 0.5891 0.4920
Corporate pur-
poses
= 1 if the loan purpose is general corporate
purposes funding.
4807 0.1059 0.3077
Debt repayment = 1 if the loan purpose is debt repayment
funding.
4807 0.1949 0.3962
Working capital = 1 if the loan purpose is working capital
funding.
4807 0.0786 0.2692
Project ﬁnance = 1 if the loan purpose is project ﬁnance
funding.
4807 0.1009 0.3012
Libor = 1 if the benchmark rate is the Libor. 4807 0.2592 0.4382




Number of arrangers in the syndicate. 4807 3.6004 3.6992
Concentration
of arrangers
Normalized Herﬁndhal-Hirschman Index of
the loan shares retained by arrangers.
4530 0.2443 0.2409
26Table 1: (continued)




Percentage of the syndicate arrangers in the
top 10-th centile of the most frequent ar-





Percentage of the syndicate arrangers in the
top 10-th centile regarding market share of




Percentage of the syndicate arrangers in the
Loan Pricing Corporate (Reuters) Global




Percentage of the syndicate ’top lenders’4




Percentage of the syndicate ’mid lenders’5




Percentage of the syndicate ’mid’ and ’low’6




Percentage of the syndicate ’top’ and ’low’
lenders from the same country.
4530 0.0917 0.1365
Country characteristics
Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of cred-
itor rights. The index ranges from zero
(weak creditor rights) to four (strong credi-
tor rights)
3782 2.7343 0.9635
Rule of law An index indicating the law enforcement.
The index ranges from zero (weak enforce-
ment) to ten (strong enforcement)
4245 6.9136 2.0854
1: We count the number of times a particular arranger participates in a syndicated loan in the sample and we use the 90-th
percentile of its distribution to distinguish top arrangers for participation intensity. Then we compute the percentage of
such top arrangers in a syndicate for every deal.
2: We compute for each arranger the sum of all syndicated loans shares funded per year and we divide this number by the
sum of syndicated loans per year in the sample. We use the 90-th percentile of the distribution of this variable to distinguish
top arrangers for market shares. Then we compute the percentage of these arrangers in a syndicate for every deal.
3: LPC (Reuters) Global League Table arrangers are: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Calyon, Citigroup, ING,
JP Morgan, Mitsubishi Financial, Royal Bank of Scotland, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking.
4: Lenders are classiﬁed as ’top’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: administrative agent, agent, arranger,
bookrunner, lead arranger, mandated arranger, senior arranger, underwriter, lead bank, joint arranger, managing agent,
senior managing agent, syndication agent, co-agent, co-arranger, senior co-arranger, sub-underwriter, co-lead arranger,
co-syndication agent, co-underwriter.
5: Lenders are classiﬁed as ’mid’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: lead manager, senior lead manager,
co-lead manager, expanded lead manager, senior co-lead manager, manager, co-manager, senior manager.
6: Lenders are classiﬁed as ’low’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: participant, lender, senior lender.
27Table 2: Distribution of the number of loans and lenders-
tranches, and mean syndication process duration by country
The table provides the number of loans and lenders-tranches, as well as respective in sample frequency, by country, as well
as mean values of the endogenous variable Syndication process duration by borrower country.
Country Number of Freq. Syndication process Number of Freq.
loans duration lenders-tranches
Argentina - - - 10 0.03
Australia 172 3.58 63.61 158 0.55
Austria 3 0.06 51.33 924 3.21
Bahrain 11 0.23 37.81 297 1.03
Belgium 21 0.44 49.52 744 2.59
Bermuda 2 0.04 56.00 - -
Bulgaria 2 0.04 43.00 - -
Canada - - - 543 1.89
Cayman Islands 10 0.21 48.00 - -
China 350 7.28 59.99 101 0.35
Croatia 10 0.21 46.20 16 0.06
Cyprus - - - 16 0.06
Czech Republic 2 0.04 125.00 56 0.19
Denmark 10 0.21 54.3 325 1.13
Egypt 7 0.15 53.00 86 0.30
Finland 14 0.29 39.28 167 0.58
France 167 3.47 52.31 3894 13.54
Germany 117 2.43 53.06 4819 16.76
Ghana 3 0.06 45.33 - -
Greece 7 0.15 63.00 168 0.58
Hong Kong 759 15.79 51.38 409 1.42
Hungary 21 0.44 50.57 154 0.54
Iceland 4 0.08 41.25 19 0.07
India 190 3.95 56.45 48 0.17
Indonesia 525 10.92 61.49 30 0.10
Iran - - - 35 0.12
Ireland 5 0.10 45.00 319 1.11
Israel - - - 74 0.26
Italy 47 0.98 51.95 1593 5.54
Japan 57 1.19 47.26 1906 6.63
Jordan - - - 119 0.41
Kazakhstan 5 0.10 32.00 - -
Korea (South) 616 12.81 32.74 44 0.15
Kuwait 2 0.04 64.00 182 0.63
Latvia - - - 22 0.08
28Table 2: (continued)
Country Number of Freq. Syndication process Number of Freq.
loans duration lenders-tranches
Luxembourg 14 0.29 68.85 334 1.16
Malaysia 151 3.14 70.10 22 0.08
Malta - - - 15 0.05
Morocco - - - 16 0.06
Netherlands 61 1.27 57.57 2034 7.07
New Zealand 28 0.58 57.07 - -
Norway 20 0.42 42.10 303 1.05
Oman 5 0.10 116.80 90 0.31
Pakistan 19 0.40 38.47 14 0.05
Papua New Guinea 5 0.10 93.60 - -
Philippines 115 2.39 69.23 - -
Poland 17 0.35 65.82 111 0.39
Portugal 15 0.31 40.53 288 1.00
Qatar 6 0.12 80.83 107 0.37
Romania 8 0.17 47.15 21 0.07
Russian Federation 31 0.64 50.48 44 0.15
Saudi Arabia 4 0.08 18.50 187 0.65
Singapore 155 3.22 54.66 72 0.25
Slovakia 2 0.04 50.50 37 0.13
Slovenia 9 0.19 43.33 13 0.05
South Africa 21 0.44 47.95 74 0.26
Spain 30 0.62 46.76 489 1.70
Sri Lanka 3 0.06 38.33 - -
Sweden 26 0.54 47.65 327 1.14
Switzerland 14 0.29 43.57 396 1.38
Taiwan 293 6.10 86.01 200 0.70
Thailand 395 8.22 56.29 - -
Tunisia 3 0.06 48.00 36 0.13
Turkey 21 0.44 31.71 65 0.23
United Arab Emirates 6 0.12 56.66 296 1.03
United Kingdom 165 3.43 51.57 2701 9.39
United States of America - - - 3047 10.60
Venezuela 3 0.06 113.66 - -
Vietnam 14 0.29 77.92 - -
29Table 3: Estimation results with syndicate size, experience, concentration,
and reputation measures only
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution for diﬀerent
speciﬁcations (1.1 to 1.5) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent variable is Syndication process
duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond
to coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate,
facility active year, industry and geographical areas dummies included but not reported.
Speciﬁcations (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5)
Number of arrangers -0.0185∗∗∗
(0.0022)
Concentration of arrangers -0.2899∗∗∗
(0.0768)
Top 10 arrangers (presence) -0.1556∗∗∗
(0.026)
Top 10 arrangers (market) -0.3731∗∗
(0.1502)
League table arrangers -0.1164∗∗∗
(0.0269)
Loan size 0.0193∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Spread 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005 -0.0004∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee -0.0007 -0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Maturity 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0088 0.0291∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0349∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0287) (0.0167) (0.0191) (0.0168)
Covenants 0.1126∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0656∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0205) (0.0127) (0.013) (0.013)
Senior debt 0.1199 1.0468∗∗∗ -0.1251 -0.2349∗∗∗ -0.1375
(0.0821) (0.0796) (0.0794) (0.0657) (0.0858)
S&P rating 0.2562 -0.5874∗∗∗ 0.0176 0.016 0.0376
(0.471) (0.0442) (0.04) (0.0387) (0.0363)
Creditor rights 0.0998∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0214) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0093)
Rule of law -0.1539∗∗∗ 0.1661∗∗∗ 0.0052 -0.0016 -0.0085
(0.0152) (0.0324) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Intercept -32.2318∗∗∗ -8.3350 -37.9221∗∗∗ -27.4776∗∗∗ -27.8578∗∗∗
(11.3297) (8.5718) (7.2874) (7.2863) (6.8453)
N 3274 2596 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 2171.887 6713.32 8350.456 4377.684 6959.042
30Table 4: Estimation results with syndicate composition measures only
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution for
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (2.1 to 2.4) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent variable
is Syndication process duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical areas dummies
included but not reported.
Speciﬁcations (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Same country top lenders 0.1388∗∗∗ 0.1075∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0274)
Same country mid lenders -0.1055∗∗∗
(0.0386)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0505∗∗
(0.0242)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0466
(0.0356)
Loan size -0.0232∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0264∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.0065) (0.0064)
Spread -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Maturity 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.04∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0317∗ 0.0295∗
(0.016) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0163)
Covenants 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.013) (0.0131)
Senior debt -0.1403∗∗ -0.1504∗∗ -0.1319∗ -0.1401∗
(0.0713) (0.0724) (0.0773) (0.0801)
S&P rating 0.0141 0.0187 0.0235 0.026
(0.035) (0.0351) (0.0371) (0.0372)
Creditor rights 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.009)
Rule of law 0.0153 0.0075 -0.0040 -0.0054
(0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0133)
Intercept -27.6439∗∗∗ -32.5827∗∗∗ -28.1710∗∗∗ -28.2415∗∗∗
(6.6182) (6.9538) (6.9599) (7.1009)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 7349.766 7970.226 7857.641 8143.089
31Table 5: Estimation results with syndicate size, experience,
reputation, and composition measures
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution
for diﬀerent speciﬁcations in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent variable is
Syndication process duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Loan and country characteristics, as well as loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility
active year, industry and geographical areas dummies included but not reported.
Speciﬁcations (1.1a) (1.1b) (1.1c) (1.1d)
Number of arrangers -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Same country top lenders 0.2139∗∗∗ 0.1757∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0406)
Same country mid lenders -0.1955∗∗∗
(0.0647)
Same country mid-low -0.2875∗∗∗
(0.0425)
Same country top-low 0.2843∗∗∗
(0.0556)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 2360.716 2473.53 2183.467 2419.181
Speciﬁcations (1.3a) (1.3b) (1.3c) (1.3d)
Top 10 arrangers (presence) -0.1218∗∗∗ -0.1147∗∗∗ -0.1560∗∗∗ -0.1537∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0283) (0.0279)
Same country top lenders 0.1109∗∗∗ 0.0864∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0295)
Same country mid lenders -0.0877∗∗
(0.0403)
Same country mid-low lenders 0.0011
(0.0267)
Same country top-low lenders 0.011
(0.0376)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 7885.444 8439.457 8408.059 8414.194
32Table 5: (continued)
Speciﬁcations (1.4a) (1.4b) (1.4c) (1.4d)
Top 10 arrangers (market) -0.3595∗∗ -0.3714∗∗ -0.3707∗∗ -0.3807∗∗
(0.1626) (0.1718) (0.152) (0.1539)
Same country top lenders 0.1294∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.031)
Same country mid lenders -0.1101∗∗∗
(0.0376)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0455
(0.0444)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0528
(0.033)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 4279.283 4509.396 4436.914 4403.339
Speciﬁcations (1.5a) (1.5b) (1.5c) (1.5d)
League table arrangers -0.1024∗∗∗ -0.0968∗∗∗ -0.1116∗∗∗ -0.1138∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.027)
Same country top lenders 0.1298∗∗∗ 0.1026∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0276)
Same country mid lenders -0.0931∗∗
(0.0385)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0338
(0.024)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0339
(0.0349)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 6727.139 7299.141 6997.724 7127.783
33Table 6: Estimation results with syndicate size, concentration, experience, repu-
tation, and composition measures for borrowers with low reputation
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution for
diﬀerent speciﬁcations in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent variable is Syndication
process duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 1. A borrower is considered as having low reputation
when he has dealt with less than 8 diﬀerent arrangers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
correspond to coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Loan and country charac-
teristics, as well as loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical
areas dummies included but not reported.
Speciﬁcations (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Number of arrangers -0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0027)
Concentration of arrangers -0.4246∗∗
(0.1847)
Top 10 arrangers (presence) -0.1329∗∗∗
(0.0289)
Top 10 arrangers (market) 0.1154
(0.085)
League table arrangers -0.0605∗∗
(0.0296)
N 1815 1424 2016 2016 2016
Chi2 975.2344 7455.112 4265.071 4226.595 3915.856
Speciﬁcations (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Same country top lenders 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.0332
(0.0262) (0.0287)
Same country mid lenders -0.1936∗∗∗
(0.0412)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0199
(0.0277)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0878∗∗
(0.0356)
N 2016 2016 2016 2016
Chi2 3681.651 3915.94 3885.31 3985.052
34Table 7: Estimation results with syndicate size, concentration, experience, repu-
tation, and composition measures for opaque borrowers
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma
distribution for diﬀerent speciﬁcations in terms of syndicate organization measures. The
dependent variable is Syndication process duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table
1. A borrower is considered as opaque when he is not listed on a stock exchange. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Loan and country characteristics, as well as loan type,
loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical areas dummies
included but not reported.
Speciﬁcations (x) (xi) (xii)
Top 10 arrangers (presence) -0.1874∗∗∗
(0.0348)
Top 10 arrangers (market) -0.7555∗∗∗
(0.2544)
League table arrangers -0.1478∗∗∗
(0.0401)
N 2003 2003 2003
Chi2 6627.354 4292.728 6179.461
Speciﬁcations (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi)
Same country top lenders 0.2264∗∗∗ 0.2095∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0321)
Same country mid lenders -0.0590
(0.0596)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0696∗
(0.0403)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0226
(0.0557)
N 2003 2003 2003 2003
Chi2 6157.238 6308.005 6199.639 6218.004
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